文章基本信息

标题：Can Governments Reverse First-Mover Advantages of Foreign Competitors?
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作者：Armando Jose Garcia Pires
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2012
卷号：32
期号：2
页码：1527-1536
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：We show that governments can use export subsidies to reduce or even reverse the first-mover advantages of foreign competitors. In particular, if the cost disadvantage of Stackelberg followers relatively to Stackelberg leaders is not too large, the export subsidy makes the former produce more than the latter. Welfare unambiguously increases in countries with Stackelberg followers and in consumer countries, but decreases in countries with Stackelberg leaders. In turn, depending on the relative difference in cost competitiveness between leaders and followers, welfare can either increase or decrease in the world economy.
关键词：Export Subsidies; First-Mover Advantages; Asymmetric Competitiveness.