文章基本信息

标题：Imitation, local interaction, and efficiency: reappraisal
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作者：Hsiao-Chi Chen ; Yunshyong Chow ; Li-Chau Wu 等
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2012
卷号：32
期号：1
页码：675-684
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：We revisit the model of Alos-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) but under the assumption that risk-dominant equilibria are Pareto efficient. It is found that risk-dominant equilibria, non-risk-dominant equilibria, and some non-monomorphic states can emerge in the long run when players interact with their immediate neighbors only.
关键词：Coordination game; imitation; local interaction