文章基本信息

标题：Comment on social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments
本地全文：下载
作者：Alexander Smith
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2012
卷号：32
期号：1
页码：923-931
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：Fischbacher and Gaechter (AER, 2010) find that contributions decline in repeatedly played public good games because people are imperfect conditional cooperators who match others' contributions only partly. We re-examine the data using dynamic panel data methods and find that contributions also decline because people only partially match their own contributions from previous periods. We discuss possible interpretations.
关键词：Public Goods; Conditional Cooperation; Dynamic Panel Data Methods