文章基本信息

标题：Venture Capital Contracting with Renegotiation
本地全文：下载
作者：Arieh Gavious ; Ramy Elitzur
期刊名称：Economics Bulletin
电子版ISSN：1545-2921
出版年度：2009
卷号：29
期号：1
页码：67-78
出版社：Economics Bulletin
摘要：This paper examines contracting between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur in a setting with unobservable effort when contracts are renegotiated each period. The contribution of our paper lies in the insights it provides on optimal contracts in this setting. The insights from our model prove to be significantly different in certain respects than those obtained under a multi-period contract without renegotiation or a single period setting. An example is worked out to illustrate the division of payoff between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur each period