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标题：Evaluating the Conditions for Robust Mechanism Design
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作者：Takashi Kunimoto ; Roberto Serrano
期刊名称：Economics Working Papers / Brown University
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
出版社：Brown University
摘要：We assess the strength of the di.erent conditions identified in the literature of robustmechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility,robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility hasbeen shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robustmonotonicity and robust measurability have been shown to be necessary for robust(full) exact and virtual implementation, respectively. This paper shows that whileviolations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily goaway, we identify a mild condition on environments in which robust measurability issatisfied by all social choice functions over an open and dense subset of first-order types.We conclude that there is a precise sense in which robust virtual implementation canbe significantly more permissive than robust exact implementation
关键词：robust mechanism design; ex post incentive compatibility; robust mono-;tonicity; robust measurability