文章基本信息

标题：Regret Matching with Finite Memory
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作者：Rene Saran ; Roberto Serrano
期刊名称：Economics Working Papers / Brown University
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
出版社：Brown University
摘要：We consider the regret matching process with finite memory. For generalgames in normal form, it is shown that any recurrent class of the dynamicsmust be such that the action profiles that appear in it constitute a closed setunder the "same or better reply" correspondence (CUSOBR set) that does notcontain a smaller product set that is closed under "same or better replies," i.e.,a smaller PCUSOBR set. Two characterizations of the recurrent classes areo.ered. First, for the class of weakly acyclic games under better replies, eachrecurrent class is monomorphic and corresponds to each pure Nash equilibrium.Second, for a modified process with random sampling, if the sample size issu.ciently small with respect to the memory bound, the recurrent classesconsist of action profiles that are minimal PCUSOBR sets. Our results areused in a robust example that shows that the limiting empirical distributionof play can be arbitrarily far from correlated equilibria for any large but finitechoice of the memory bound
关键词：Regret Matching; Nash Equilibria; Closed Sets under Same or;Better Replies; Correlated Equilibria