文章基本信息

标题：Collusion Among Many Firms: The Disciplinary Power of Targeted Punishment
本地全文：下载
作者：Catherine Roux ; Christian Thöni
期刊名称：DEEP Cahiers de Recherches Économiques / Université de Lausanne
出版年度：2013
出版社：Université de Lausanne
摘要：We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. In a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with various numbers of firms, we compare production decisions with and without the possibility to target punishment at specific market participants. We find strong evidence that targeted punishment enables firms to establish and maintain collusion. More so, we find that the collusive effect of targeted punishment is even stronger in markets with more competitors, suggesting a reversal of the conventional wisdom that collusion is easier the fewer the firms
关键词：Cournot oligopoly; Experiments; Collusion; Targeted punishment