文章基本信息

标题：Outside Finance, Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency
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作者：Enrico C. Perotti ; Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
期刊名称：DEEP Cahiers de Recherches Économiques / Université de Lausanne
出版年度：2001
页码：61-85
出版社：Université de Lausanne
摘要：This paper studies optimal financial contracts and product market competition under a strategic transparency decision. When firms seeking outside finance resort to actively monitored debt in order to commit against opportunistic behaviour, the dominant lender can influence corporate transparency. More transparency about a firm's competitive position has both strategic advantages and disadvantages: in general, transparency results in higher variability of profits and output. Thus lenders prefer less information dissemination, as this protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equityholders prefer more disclosure to maximize profitability when in a strong position. We show that bank-controlled firms will be opaque, while shareholder-run firms prefer more transparency. In fact, we can predict a clustering of characteristics associated with bank dominance: opaqueness, low variability of profits, slightly reduced average profits, uncertainty about assets in place, and relatively high financing needs all should be observed jointly for bank controlled firms
关键词：corporate governance; transparency; bank finance; product market competition; capital