期刊名称:Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics
电子版ISSN:1664-5278
出版年度:2012
卷号:4
页码:250-261
出版社:European Society for Aesthetics
摘要:I first show that even minimalist narratives (in any for- mulation of minimalism that can encompass the views of Lamarque, Carroll, Currie and Jureidini, and Velleman) there are sufficient re- sources both for generating a basic level literature and for sustain- ing serious philosophical inquiry. However, I do not adopt (pace, for example, Mag Uidhir and many others) a "fiction-first" strategy, in which we learn the lessons about narrative per se from studying fictional narratives first, and only then apply those lessons to non- fictional narratives. Accordingly, I adopt a different methodological strategy in which I assume, for argument, that no narratives were ever offered as fictional, and that instead all the narratives that ever were are believed to be attempts to accurately record or order the facts and are assessed both as to their narrative structure and ef- fects and as to their truth or falsity. On that assumption, our task is to determine what mental mechanisms, if any, would be involved in grasping and projecting narratives. The mental states that even minimal narratives can induce have two aspects that make them of interest: first, they belong to a broad class of anticipatory states – including apprehension, anxiety and suspense – that include both cognitive and emotive elements; and second, they are often induced subdoxastically. I argue that recognizing this pair of facts has three interesting and useful payoffs for further research.