文章基本信息

标题：Which Spouse First Decides in the Household? The Dynamics of Bargaining
本地全文：下载
作者：Joaquín Andaluz Funcia ; Miriam Marcén ; José Alberto Molina Chueca 等
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2013
卷号：3
期号：1
页码：69-77
DOI：10.4236/tel.2013.31011
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：This paper examines the effects of which spouse first decides in the intrahousehold decision on the time that each spouse devotes to the provision of a family good. Specifically, we adopt a dynamic approach by developing a supergame, with the status quo being sequential, to study the influence of the discount factor, which measures the importance of the future, on the set of sustainable agreements in intrahousehold bargaining. We first show that cooperation is easily sustained. We then observe a positive relationship between the discount factor and the proportion of time that the follower devotes to housework, when focusing on sustainable agreements, with this finding being maintained even if the follower has higher wages than the spouse leader.
关键词：Family Bargaining; Stackelberg Game; Family Good