文章基本信息

标题：A Note on Timing of Endogenous Wage Bargaining: The Case of Complements
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作者：Kangsik Choi ; Minhwan Lee
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2013
卷号：3
期号：1
页码：28-37
DOI：10.4236/tel.2013.31005
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：By introducing Cournot and Bertrand competition in adifferentiated goods with the case of complements into Nash bargaining solution problem, we investigate timing of endogenous wage setting where wages can be negotiated either simultaneously or sequentially. Contrary to the case of substitutes, we show that regardless of the bargaining power, the type of product market competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and the degree of complementarity, 1) bargaining over wages is always simultaneous when the goods are complements; and 2) the social welfare under both Cournot and Bertrand competitions can improve when bargaining over wages is simultaneous.
关键词：Bargaining; Complements; Cournot-Bertrand Competition; Social Welfare