文章基本信息

标题：Strategic Delegation in Price Competition
本地全文：下载
作者：Werner Güth ; Kerstin Pull ; Manfred Stadler 等
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2012
卷号：2
期号：4
页码：355-360
DOI：10.4236/tel.2012.24065
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：We study price competition in heterogeneous markets where price decisions are delegated to agents. Principals implement a revenue sharing scheme to which agents react by commonly charging a sales price. The results of our model exemplify the importance of both intra- and interfirm interactions of principals and agents in competition. We show that price delegation can increase or decrease the firms’ surplus depending on the heterogeneity of the market and the number of agents employed by the firms.
关键词：Strategic Delegation; Gency Theory; Evenue Sharing