文章基本信息

标题：Elective Affinities
本地全文：下载
作者：Daniela Di Cagno ; Emanuela Sciubba ; Marco Spallone 等
期刊名称：Theoretical Economics Letters
印刷版ISSN：2162-2078
电子版ISSN：2162-2086
出版年度：2011
卷号：1
期号：3
页码：134-136
DOI：10.4236/tel.2011.13028
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：We propose a marriage model where assortative matching results in equilibrium for reasons other than those driving similar results in the search and matching literature. A marriage is a joint venture where husband and wife contribute to the couple’s welfare by allocating their time to portfolios of risky activities. Men and women are characterised by different preferences over risk and the optimal match is between partners with the same level of risk aversion. In our model no two men (women) rank the same woman (men) as most desirable. Given that there is no unanimous ranking of candidates, everyone marries in equilibrium their most preferred partner.
关键词：Marriage Model; Risk Aversion