文章基本信息

标题：Capacity Choice in a Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly with Network Effects
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作者：Yasuhiko Nakamura
期刊名称：Modern Economy
印刷版ISSN：2152-7245
电子版ISSN：2152-7261
出版年度：2013
卷号：4
期号：5
页码：418-425
DOI：10.4236/me.2013.45044
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：This paper explores the capacity choice for a public firm that is a welfare-maximizer and for a private firm that is a pure-profit-maximizer in the context of a price-setting mixed duopoly with a simple mechanism of network effects where the surplus that a firm’s client gets increases with the number of other clients of that firm. In this paper, we show that the public firm chooses over-capacity irrespective of the strength of network effects and the demand parameter, and that the difference between the output level and capacity level of the private firm strictly depends on the values of both the strength of network effects and the demand parameter. More precisely, the private firm chooses over-capacity when the strength of network effects is high relative to the demand parameter, while it chooses under-capacity otherwise.
关键词：Mixed Duopoly; Price Competition; Network Effects; Capacity Choice