文章基本信息

标题：Game-Theoretic Analysis of Renouncing Membership of a Party to Announce Candidacy
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作者：Jue-Shyan Wang ; Mei-Yin Lin
期刊名称：Modern Economy
印刷版ISSN：2152-7245
电子版ISSN：2152-7261
出版年度：2012
卷号：3
期号：5
页码：653-657
DOI：10.4236/me.2012.35084
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：A game model is established to analyze the interaction in strategy when there is a candidate who renounces membership of a party to run for a position. We use the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss two models in which the candidate without nominations moves first or the decision maker of the other party moves first respectively. The main finding is that the equilibrium strategy of the decision maker of the other party is identical when the opponent runs for a position, regardless of who moving first. However, the probability of the candidate without nomination to run for a position is larger when he moves first.
关键词：Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Sequential Equilibrium