文章基本信息

标题：Monopoly and Economic Efficiency: Perspective from an Efficiency Wage Model
本地全文：下载
作者：Bo Zhao
期刊名称：Modern Economy
印刷版ISSN：2152-7245
电子版ISSN：2152-7261
出版年度：2011
卷号：2
期号：5
页码：830-833
DOI：10.4236/me.2011.25092
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：The objective of this paper is to analyze the efficiency consequences of monopoly from the perspective of an efficiency-wage model based on Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). An important innovation of our model is that a firm can raise the probability that a shirking worker is detected by increasing its effort or investment in the monitoring of workers. By comparing with the competitive equilibrium we find that monopoly is associated with higher unemployment rate and less monitoring. Surprisingly, however, monopoly is not necessarily dominated by perfect competition in terms of economic efficiency.
关键词：Monopoly; Economic Efficiency; Unemployment; Efficiency Wage