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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Who Is Concealing Earnings and Still Collecting Unemployment Benefits?
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:David L. Fuller ; B. Ravikumar ; Yuzhe Zhang
  • 期刊名称:Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Regional Economist
  • 出版年度:2013
  • 出版社:Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
  • 摘要:

    The unemployment insurance program in the U.S. offers benefits to workers if they lose their jobs through no fault of their own. In 2011, this program cost $108 billion, of which nearly $3.3 billion was spent on overpayments due to fraud.1

    Unemployment insurance fraud occurs when an ineligible individual collects benefits after intentionally misreporting his or her eligibility. Recent headlines have brought attention to extreme forms of fraud, such as the collection of unemployment benefits by prisoners.2 The dominant form of unemployment insurance fraud, however, is what's called concealed earnings fraud. This fraud occurs when individuals collect unemployment benefits while they are employed and are earning wages. The overpayments due to concealed earnings accounted for almost $2.2 billion in 2011, two-thirds of the total overpayments due to all categories of fraud.3

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