文章基本信息

标题："Insurance Contracts Designed by Competitive Pooling
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作者：Pradeep Dubey ; John Geanakoplos
期刊名称：COWLES Foundation Discussion Paper / Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
期号：1
出版社：Yale University
摘要：We build a model of competitive pooling and show how insurance contracts emerge in equilibrium, designed by the invisible hand of perfect competition. When pools are exclusive, we obtain a unique separating equilibrium. When pools are not exclusive but seniority is recognized, we obtain a different unique equilibrium: the pivotal primary-secondary equilibrium. Here reliable and unreliable households take out a common primary insurance up to its maximum limit, and then unreliable households take out further secondary insurance.
关键词：Competitive pooling; insurance contracts; adverse selection; signalling; seniority; equilibrium refinement