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  • 标题:Cournot Equilibrium In A Model Of Hardware And Software Manufacturers’ Interaction
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Vladimir I. Soloviev ; State University of Management Moscow Natalia A. Iliina ; State University of Management Moscow Marina V. Samoyavcheva
  • 期刊名称:Annales Universitatis Apulensis : Series Oeconomica
  • 印刷版ISSN:1454-9409
  • 出版年度:2009
  • 卷号:1
  • 期号:11
  • 出版社:“1 Decembrie 1918” University of Alba Iulia
  • 摘要:A model of interaction between hardware vendors, Intel and AMD, and developers of Windows and Linux operating systems is suggested. Intel and AMD both maximize profits forming a traditional oligopoly, while Microsoft and the community of Linux developers form a mixed duopoly, in which only the first party maximizes its profit. We consider a Cournot situation, when each of the profit-maximizing suppliers sets the price based on available market information on other players’ products prices in the previous time moment, and assuming the cross-price elasticities to zero. At the Cournot equilibrium, an Intel-based PC running Windows is 5 times more expensive than AMD-based PC running Linux; an Intel CPU costs 2 times more than AMD processor; Windows license is 1,5 times more expensive than Intel processor; and the profit of Intel is 4 times greater than the profit of AMD, while Microsoft has just 12,5% greater profit than Intel.
  • 关键词:complementors; complements; co-opetition; Cournot equilibrium; pricing.€H?
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