文章基本信息

标题：Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts
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作者：Malatesti, Luca
期刊名称：Synthesis philosophica
印刷版ISSN：0352-7875
出版年度：2012
卷号：26
期号：2
页码：391-402
出版社：Croatian Philosophical Society
摘要：Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument and different conceivability arguments, advanced by Saul Kripke, David Chalmers and Joseph Levine, conclude that consciousness involves non-physical properties or properties that cannot be reductively accounted for in physical terms. Some physicalists have replied to these objections by means of different versions of the phenomenal concept strategy. David Chalmers has responded with the master argument, a reasoning that, if successful, would undermine any reasonable version of the phenomenal concept strategy. In this paper, I argue that the master argument does not advance the debate between the supporters of the anti-physicalist arguments and those of the phenomenal concept strategy.
关键词：consciousness; qualia; zombies; a posteriori physicalism; phenomenal concept strategy; David Chalmers’s master argument