文章基本信息

标题：ASYMETRIC INFORMATION IN HEALTH INSURANCE: SOME PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE FROM THE CROATIAN STATE-ADMINISTERED SUPPLEMENTAL PLAN
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作者：Vukina, Tomislav ; Nestić, Danijel
期刊名称：Economic Trends and Economic Policy
印刷版ISSN：1330-187X
出版年度：2008
卷号：18
期号：115
页码：24-47
出版社：The Institute of Economics and Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia
摘要：In this paper, we conduct simple micro-level econometric tests for the presence of the moral hazard and adverse selection manifestations in the Croatian supplemental health insurance program. Despite the fact that the obtained results are rather preliminary, they seem to be indicating the statistically significant presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard types of problems with various degrees of difficulty that they actually cause to the functioning of the Croatian health insurance system. The obtained results are then used to outline several policy recommendations in the realm of health insurance reform.
关键词：health insurance; adverse selection; moral hazard