文章基本信息

标题：Limit policies in N-sector dynamic growth games with externalities
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作者：Ronald D. Fischer ; Leonard J. Mirman
期刊名称：Advances in Decision Sciences
印刷版ISSN：2090-3359
电子版ISSN：2090-3367
出版年度：1997
卷号：1
DOI：10.1155/S1173912697000084
出版社：Hindawi Publishing Corporation
摘要：We examine an economy with n production sectors that interact via a production externality. We find a solution to the resulting dynamic differential game between sectors and compare it to the cooperative solution. As the number of sectors increases, the limiting policy is the optimal policy without a production externality. This policy is inefficient and, depending on the sign of the externality between sectors, the inefficiency is due to over- (or under-) consumption.