文章基本信息

标题：Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly
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作者：Andrea MANTOVANI ; Giordano MION
期刊名称：Discussion Paper / Département des Sciences Économiques de l'Université Catholique de Louvain
印刷版ISSN：1379-244X
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
出版社：Université catholique de Louvain
摘要：In this paper we consider a two-stage duopoly game where fîrrns first decide whether to invest in advertising and then compete in prices. Advertising has two effects : a market enlargement for both firms and a predatory gain for the investing firm only. Both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria may arise. The two most interesting cases are a coordination game where both firms investing and non-investing are equilibria. and a chicken game where only one firm invests while the other is possibly driven (endogenously) out of the market. Our results suggest that product differentiation has an ambiguous impact on investinent in advertising and that strong product substitutability may induce a coordination problem.
关键词：Advertising, product differenciation, endogenous exit, asymmetric equilibria, coordination games