摘要:The current economic crisis has hit all European countries hard, but some are more
severely affected than others. The problems manifest in European peripheral countries that are
also members of the Eurozone, that is, Ireland, Spain, and Greece, have roots in domestic policy
mistakes. However, the European context of these policy profiles also needs to be taken into
account. The creation of the Euro initially yielded large credibility gains for the weaker economies,
extending low interest rates across the Eurozone. But it also introduced a set of perverse
incentives toward fiscal expansion which were supposed to be managed at domestic level. Weak
European coordinating capacity meant there were few effective external disciplines on national
decision making. The sanctions built into the Stability and Growth Pact proved more controversial
and, therefore, less constraining than originally envisaged. The problems accumulating in the
weaker economies made them particularly exposed to crisis when the downturn came. The crisis
is not merely one of peripheral economies’ policy errors, but extends to the design of European
decision making and the management of monetary union, and to the underlying structural
differences in relative trade capabilities between Eurozone member states. These issues are
explored with reference to the Irish case: the crisis of the Irish and other peripheral economies
points to a number of unresolved difficulties at the heart of European politics.