摘要:This paper explores patterns of discrimination between residents and foreign creditors during
recents sovereign debt restructurings. We analyze 10 recent episodes distinguishing between
neutral cases in which the sovereign treated creditors equitably irrespective of their nationality
and instances of discrimination against residents and non-residents. We then present evidence
in support of the hypothesis that these patterns of discrimination can be explained by the
origin of liquidity pressures, the ex ante soundness of the banking system and the extent of
the domestic corporate sector’s reliance on international fi nancial markets. On the theoretical
side, we present a simple model of a government’s strategic decision to diferentiate between
the servicing of its domestic and its external debt. In our model, the basic trade-off facing
the authorities is to default on external debt and in so doing restricting private access to
international capital markets or to default on domestic debt, thereby curtailing the banking
sector’s capacity to lend to domestic fi rms.
关键词:Keywords: Sovereign default, discrimination, bank credit, foreign capital.