文章基本信息

标题：Disincentive Effects of Unemployment Benefits on the Paths Out of Unemployment
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作者：Pedro Portugal ; John T. Addison
期刊名称：CESifo Forum
印刷版ISSN：1615-245X
出版年度：2004
期号：01
出版社：Ifo Institute for Economic Research
摘要：The role of unemployment insurance (UI) in pro- longing unemployment duration is well estab- lished. Job search theory informs us that subsidized search will elevate the reservation wage, and an extensive empirical literature has duly confirmed the prediction that this will lead to longer unemploy- ment duration on the part of recipients (see Mortensen 1997; Devine and Kiefer 1991). But the other key prediction when benefits are finite – that the disincentive effects of UI will vary through time, declining with the approach of benefit expiration – has been altogether less subject to empirical scrutiny. Only a handful of studies have allowed for time- varying UI effects, although they clearly reject the constraint that unemployment benefits have the same effect throughout the course of the jobless spell (see Addison and Portugal 2004). Finally, there is no real theoretical recognition of the various exit options available to the unemployed individual and virtually no investigation of whether access to UI affects choice between them.