文章基本信息

标题：Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation.
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作者：Yassine LEFOUILI ; Catherine ROUX.
期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Abstract We examine the effect of the Amnesty Plus policy on the incentives of firms to engage in cartel activities. Amnesty Plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms, convicted in one market, to report their collusive agreements in other markets. It has been vigorously advertised that Amnesty Plus weakens cartel stability. We show to the contrary that Amnesty Plus may not have this desirable effect, and, if improperly designed, may even stabilize a cartel. We suggest a simple discount-setting rule to avoid this anticompetitive effect.
关键词：Keywords: Amnesty Plus, Leniency program, multimarket contact, antitrust policy.