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标题：First Things First? The Agenda Formation Problem for Multi-Issue Committees
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作者：Francesca Flamini
期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2001
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：It is often argued that multi-issue committees should discuss issues simultaneously to avoid inefficiency. However, in practice, parties can be constrained to discuss issues sequentially and in this case, existing game-theoretical models give inconclusive results: either parties have different preferences over agendas or they are indifferent. We show that when there is an important issue, parties have the same preferences over agendas, in particular they prefer to discuss the most important issue Þrst. Moreover, when an issue is difficult/urgent (in the sense that the rejection of a proposal on this issue implies a game breakdown with a positive probability) parties prefer to postpone the negotiations over the difficult/urgent issue. We highlight several incentives that players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas. Since these are often in conßict, the existence of a Pareto optimal agenda is of particular interest