文章基本信息

标题：Dynamic Accumulation in Bargaining Games
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作者：Francesca Flamini
期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2002
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：In many bargaining situations the decisions that parties take at one point in time affect their future bargaining opportunities. We consider an ultimatum bargaining game in which parties can decide not only how to share a current surplus but also how much to invest in order to generate future surpluses. We show that there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in which a proposer consumes the whole surplus not invested. Moreover, when the proposer has a sufficiently high discount factor, his MPE investment level is higher than his opponent’s, for a given capital stock. Finally, we show that bargaining can lead to overinvestment.
关键词：dynamic accumulation, bargaining, recursive optimisation.