文章基本信息

标题：On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting
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作者：Wilko Bolt en Alexander Tieman
期刊名称：DNB Working Papers / De Nederlandsche Bank
出版年度：2005
卷号：1
出版社：De Nederlandsche Bank
摘要：We derive a stationary equilibrium in a two-player multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. At each stage, the probability to reach the next stage is determined by the players’ current actions. We assume that the players are myopic in the sense that they take the future strategies of their opponents as given. We find that the stationary myopic equilibrium of the infinite-horizon multi-stage game corresponds to the infinite repetition of a Nash equilibrium of an induced (one-shot) limit game. Interestingly, this stationary myopic equilibrium is singled out when studying limiting equilibria of the associated multi-stage game with a finite horizon.
关键词：dynamic game, myopic equlibrium, discounting, equilibrium selection. JEL Code: C72, C73, G21