文章基本信息

标题：Communication, Advice and Beliefs in an Experimental Public Goods Game
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作者：Ananish Chaudhuri ; Pushkar Maitra ; Susan Skeath 等
期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, Monash University
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
出版社：Monash University
摘要：We study the efficacy of horizontal versus vertical social learning processes in a public goods game. In one treatment, subjects about to play the game can make nonbinding common knowledge announcements about their intentions while, in another, subjects do not communicate directly with group members but receive common knowledge advice from the previous generation of players. A third treatment has subjects play with neither communication nor advice. We find that groups that engage in peer communication achieve much lower levels of contribution to the public good than do groups that receive advice. We attribute this finding in part to the fact that some subjects in the communication treatment opted to make no announcement during the communication phase of play.
关键词：Voluntary contributions mechanism, Advice, Communication, Beliefs, Experiments