文章基本信息

标题：Public versus private insurance: a political economy argument
本地全文：下载
作者：Jean HINDRIKS
期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2000
卷号：2000
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper analyzes the political support for a public insur- ance in the presence of a private insurance alternative. The public insurance is compulsory and oﬀers a uniform insurance policy. The private insurance is voluntary and can oﬀer diﬀerent insurance policies to diﬀerent individ- ual risks. We show that adverse selection on the private insurance market can lead a majority of individuals to prefer public insurance over private insurance, even if the median risk is below the average risk (so that the median ends up subsidizing high-risk individuals). We alsoshow that more risk aversion always leads to a greater political support for public insurance and that a mixture of public and private insurance is politically non sustain- able. Lastly, we demonstrate how progressively more powerful information technology may help the private insurance market to mitigate the adverse selection problem and reduce the demand for public insurance threatening its political sustainability
关键词：Voting, insurance, adverse selection.