期刊名称:Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics / Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business Management and Economics
印刷版ISSN:0945-4829
出版年度:2009
卷号:1
出版社:Dresden
摘要:In this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the influence of the possibility to make non-binding
announcements on future investment behaviour in public good settings. Our models build on the idea that voluntary
contributions to the supply of a public good might be motivated by some form of joy of giving. We show that the
possibility to make non-binding announcements has a positive effect on cooperative behaviour, especially if individual
announcements and factual investments are communicated to the players after each round. We also show that this result
holds true even though the players have an incentive to overstate their true degrees of cooperativeness. Altogether, our
theoretical considerations point in the direction that revealing as much information on individual intentions and factual
behaviour as possible enhances cooperative behaviour. These conclusions are broadly confirmed by the results of a
series of classroom experiments we present.
关键词:Public goods, Announcements, Joy of giving, Experimental economics