文章基本信息

标题：Strategic inter-regional transfers
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作者：Jean HINDRIKS ; Gareth D. MYLES
期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In this paper we derive the equilibrium level of redistribution from one mobile factor (say, the rich or capital) to another possibly mobile factor (say, the poor or labour) when regions choose both their inter-regional transfers and redistributive policies non-cooperatively. We ﬁnd that inter- regional transfers are always desirable (to mitigate the ﬁscal competition), but cannot be sustained (as a Nash equilibrium) when chosen simultane- oulsy with the redistributive policy. On the other hand if regions can pre- commit to inter-regional transfers before setting their redistributive policy, the strategic eﬀect of inter-regional transfers makes them sustainable. How- ever there are also equilibria with partial or no inter-regional transfers at all. The eﬀects of regional asymmetries are analyzed. Interestingly enough, evidence suggests that predictions of our model accord very closely with the pattern of transfers in the EU across member states.
关键词：inter-regional transfers, mobility externality, redistribution.