文章基本信息

标题：Lobbying in public decision making
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作者：Philippe JEHIEL ; Jacques-François THISSE
期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities in which lobbies bid to get implemented their most-preferred policy. Furthermore, the government may inﬂuence the lobbying process it- self by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the following trade-oﬀ: competition yields a higher transfer to the govern- ment, but the outcome of the game tends to be less eﬃcient than what it is when lobbies negotiate. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several regions. Lobbying by regions may yield a quantity of public good that may vastly diﬀer from that chosen by a majority of regions. This is so when the regions with the highest ﬁnancing shares lie at the extremes of the distribution.