文章基本信息

标题：Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening? A model of tax competition
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作者：Maurice MARCHAND ; Pierre PESTIEAU ; Motohiro SATO 等
期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2002
卷号：2002
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Most work on tax competition argues that mobile factors tend to be undertaxed except if there is coordination of tax policies. Full co- ordination is not however always feasible, and as a consequence some measures of partial coordination have been proposed such as minimal witholding taxes on interest income. We show that partial coordi- nation can be in some instances welfare worsening and that then no coordination is to be preferred.
关键词：tax competition, tax coordination, witholding tax