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标题：A Note on Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining
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作者：Francesca Flamini
期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2003
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：We study the effects of a between-cake discount factor in the agenda selection problem faced by a multi-issue committee. The presence of an interval of time between bargaining stages is a reasonable and realistic assumption. We show that this assumption simplifies the agenda selection problem strongly. In particular, the equilibrium multiplicity obtained in In and Serrano (2002) does not hold: a unique SPE can be established among the sequential bargaining procedures.
关键词：bargaining, agenda, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium