期刊名称:Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度:2003
卷号:1
出版社:University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要:Central bank behavior is often summarized by simple rules for operating
targets, i.e., for a short-run nominal interest rate or for a money
growth rate. In this paper we examine conditions under which these
rules lead to identical fundamental solutions of a conventional business
cycle model. When prices are ‡exible, forward looking interest rate rules
can be equivalent to money growth policy. In particular, the consumption
Euler equation implies that constant money growth is equivalent
to a passive interest rate regime, while an active interest rate rule corresponds
to an accommodating money growth policy. When prices are
sticky, equivalence further requires either interest rate policy or households’
behavior to be history dependent. However, a central bank, which
controls the money growth rate, cannot implement a sequence of nominal
interest rates satisfying Taylor’s (1993) rule on a saddle stable equilibrium
path.
关键词:Monetary policy regimes, fundamental solution, history dependence,
saddle path stability, beginning-of-period money.