文章基本信息

标题：Bargaining and Investment
本地全文：下载
作者：Francesca Flamini
期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2005
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：The focus of this paper is on repeated bargaining games in which two parties can decide how much to invest and how to share the remaining surplus for their own consumption. The game is dynamic since the current level of investment affects future surpluses. We characterise an MPE without delays in general terms and show the parametrical effects for the specific case in which parties share the surplus equally. We show that the relatively more patient player invests more than his opponent, for a given capital stock. Moreover, if the probability of becoming a proposer decreases for the more patient player, then such a player reduces his investment, while the relatively impatient player increases his investment.
关键词：Bargaining, Investment, Recursive Optimisation, Markov Perfect Equilibrium.