文章基本信息

标题：Cross-Border Shopping and Commodity Tax Competition in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
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作者：SungKyu Lee (National Assembly Budget Office)
期刊名称：Journal of Economic Research
印刷版ISSN：1226-4261
出版年度：2008
卷号：13
期号：2
出版社：Hanyang Economic Research Institute
摘要：This paper studies price competition between two ¯rms and tax competition between two governments by using a spatial model under the assumption of imperfect competition. With cross- border shopping, consumers try to take advantage of price or tax di®erentials and each government which maximizes the tax revenue on the basis of Leviathan model may attempt to induce cross-border shoppers into its own country by lowering its own tax rate than the competitors. In this Nash noncooperative game, there exists symmetric or asymmetric Nash equilibrium which de- pends on cost structures. In particular, tax di®erential between governments implies `asymmetric Nash equilibrium' in a noncoop- erative game. In our model, assuming imperfect competition and in particular, considering the case of di®erent production costs, it is shown that tax di®erential stems from the di®erence in costs between two ¯rms. This di®erence in tax rates induced by cost di®erential provides a major incentive not only for consumers to engage in cross-border shopping but also for governments to com- pete in taxes noncooperatively.
关键词：Cross-border shopping; Tax competition; Imperfect competition; Noncooperative game