期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2004
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：The storable votes mechanism is a method of voting for committees that meet
periodically to consider a series of binary decisions. Each member is allocated
a fixed budget of votes to be cast as desired over the multiple decisions. Voters
are induced to spend more votes on those decisions that matter to them most,
shifting the ex ante probability of winning away from decisions they value less
and towards decisions they value more, typically generating welfare gains over
standard majority voting with non-storable votes. The equilibrium strategies
have a very intuitive feature–the number of votes cast must be monotonic in
the voter’s intensity of preferences–but are otherwise difficult to calculate,
raising questions of practical implementation. In our experiments, realized
efficiency levels were remarkably close to theoretical equilibrium predictions,
while subjects adopted monotonic but off-equilibrium strategies. We are lead
to conclude that concerns about the complexity of the game may have limited
practical relevance.
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