期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：A contract with multiple agents may be susceptible to
collusion. We show that agents’ collusion imposes no cost in a large
class of circumstances with risk neutral agents, including both uncorrelated
and correlated types. In those circumstances, any payoff the
principal can attain in the absence of collusion, including the secondbest
level, can be attained in the presence of collusion in a way robust
to many aspects of collusion behavior. The collusion-proof implementation
generalizes to a setting in which only a subset of agents may
collude, provided that noncollusive agents’ incentives can be protected
via an ex post incentive compatible and ex post individually rational
mechanism. Our collusion-proof implementation also sheds light on
the extent to which hierarchical delegation of contracts can optimally
respond to collusion.
关键词：Robustly collusion-proof implementation, pairwise identifiability,
subgroup collusion, ex post implementability.
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