期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal
enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the
repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)),
have been offered as solutions to the problem of enforcing an incomplete contract. It is shown that
the efficiency of these solutions is very sensitive to the characteristics of the good or service exchanged.
In general, neither the repeat purchase mechanism nor efficiency wages is the most efficient in the set
of possible relational contracts. In many situations, total output may be increased through the use of
performance pay and through increasing the quality of law.
关键词：contract, law and economics, reputation, repeated games, incomplete contracts, transactions
costs, institutional economics, contract enforcement
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