期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：I consider a two-stage (dynamic) elimination contest with uninformed and informed
players. Informed players can signal their type to future uninformed opponents through
their efforts in the first stage. Uninformed players might make wrong inferences. It is in
this sense that they are boundedly rational. Relative to the benchmark case of complete
information, I find that there exists an equilibrium in which an informed player exerts a
higher effort in the semi-final in the incomplete-information version of the game, if the
uninformed player is sufficiently weak. The informed player exerts a smaller effort, if the
uninformed player is sufficiently strong. Intuitively, informed players may want to scare
future uninformed opponents by exerting higher efforts in earlier rounds. However, trying
to scare a very strong player may not be a sensible strategy because he might compete
very fiercely. Surprisingly, I find that a higher semi-final effort by the informed player is
not necessarily interpreted by the uninformed player as a signal of higher ability
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