期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：There are two factions in a conflict. A third-party may choose to intervene by supporting
one of the factions. We consider a third-party who maximizes a weighted sum of the
welfare of the warring factions and the non-combatant population. In the case of a non-
military intervention, we obtain the following results: if the third-party cares equally
about the warring factions and the rest of the population, then he will not intervene. If the
third-party cares more about the warring factions, then he might intervene and will help
the stronger faction unless he places a sufficiently higher weight on the welfare of the
weaker faction. The stronger faction is able to appropriate more resources from the rest of
the population. However, we find that helping the stronger faction might make the rest of
the population better off, since this reduces the aggregate cost of conflict. On efficiency
grounds, helping the weaker faction is optimal if success by the weaker faction preserves
the rule of law, respect for private property leading to higher output. We also find that the
third party is likely to intervene if success in the conflict is extremely sensitive to effort.
In the case of military intervention, we find that the third-party will intervene if he cares
sufficiently about the rest of the population or cares about the net resources that will be
left after the war. We present examples where the third-party chooses military
intervention over non-military intervention and vice-versa.
关键词：ias, cost of conflict, military intervention, non-military intervention, welfare
weights.
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