期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：In psychological games, higher-order beliefs, emotions, and motives - in addition to
actions - affect players’ payoffs. Suppose you are tolerated as opposed to being genuinely
accepted by your peers and “friends”. In particular, suppose you are invited to a party,
movie, dinner, etc not because your company is desired but because the inviter would feel
guilty if she did not invite you. In all of these cases, it is conceivable that the intention
behind the action will matter and hence will affect your payoffs. I model intentions in a
dynamic non-psychological game under incomplete information. I then modify the game
as a standard psychological game in the sense of Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti
(Games and Economic Behavior, 1989) and Rabin (American Economic Review, 1993). I
find a complex social interaction in the dynamic psychological equilibrium under
incomplete information. In particular, a player may stick to a strategy of accepting every
invitation with the goal of discouraging insincere invitations, while in the non-
psychological game this strategy is employed because all invitations are sincere. I discuss
how being tolerated but not being truly accepted can explain the rejection of mutually
beneficial trades, the choice of identity, social exclusion, marital divorce, and its
implication for political correctness and affirmative action.
关键词：guilt, intentions, psychological game, second-order beliefs, social interaction
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