文章基本信息

标题：What Do Unions Do to CEO Compensation
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作者：Rafael Gomez ; Konstantinos Tzioumis
期刊名称：CEP Occasional Paper
出版年度：2006
卷号：2006
出版社：Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
摘要：In this paper we estimate the relation between union presence within a firm and CEO compensation, using a unique panel of publicly listed companies for the period 1992 to 2001. We find that, on average, union presence: 1) is significantly associated with lower levels of total CEO compensation; 2) affects the mix of CEO compensation by providing higher levels of base pay but much lower stock option values; 3) lowers dispersion across the major components of CEO remuneration and 4) does not significantly reduce the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation as compared to non-union firms. These results are consistent with several models of union influence
关键词：Unions, CEO compensation, implicit regulation