文章基本信息

标题：Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent
本地全文：下载
作者：Maitreesh Ghatak ; Massimo Morelli ; Tomas Sjostrom 等
期刊名称：Distributional Analysis Publications
印刷版ISSN：1352-2469
出版年度：2002
卷号：2002
出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：We study an economy where agents are heterogeneous in terms of observable wealth and unobservable talent. Adverse selection forces creditors to ask for collateral. We study the two-way interaction between rationing in the credit market and the wages offered in the labour market. Both pooling and separating credit contracts can be offered in equilibrium. The minimum wealth needed to obtain a separating contract is decreasing in the wage, whereas the minimum wealth needed for a pooling contract is increasing in the wage. If the first effect dominates, the derived labour demand can be upward sloping, resulting in the possibility of multiple equilibria.
关键词：Occupational Choice, adverse selection, wealth distribution, credit rationing