文章基本信息

标题：Collective Bargaining under Complete Information
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作者：Carlos Diaz-Moreno ; Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez
期刊名称：International Studies Papers
出版年度：2000
卷号：2000
出版社：Suntory Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines
摘要：In this paper, we build and structurally estimate a complete information bargaining model of collective negotiation for Spain. For large firms, the assumption of complete information seems a sensible one, and it matches the collective bargaining environment better than the one provided by private information models. The specification of the model with players having different discount factors allows us to measure their relative bargaining power, a recurrent question in the theory of bargaining. We find that both entrepreneurs and workers have high discount factors, and no evidence that entrepreneurs have bigger bargaining power as usually assumed
关键词：Delays; sequential bargaining; structural estimation