文章基本信息

标题：A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation∗
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作者：Roberto Serrano† ; Rajiv Vohra‡
期刊名称：Economics Working Papers / Brown University
出版年度：2002
卷号：2002
出版社：Brown University
摘要：We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indiﬀerence. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisﬁes incentive compatibility and a condition we term virtual monotonicity. The latter is weaker than Bayesian monotonicity - known to be necessary for Bayesian implementation. Virtual monotonicity is weak in the sense that it is generically satisﬁed in environments with at least three alternatives. This implies that in most environments virtual Bayesian implementation is as successful as it can be (incentive compatibility is the only condition needed).
关键词：Virtual monotonicity, Bayesian monotonicity, Maskin monotonicity, virtual Bayesian implementation, incentive compatibility, type diversity.